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In this paper, using data for the period January 1995 to May 2009 for the Shanghai stock 
exchange (SHSE), we show that aggregate illiquidity is a priced risk factor. We develop the 
relationship between the illiquidity factor, asymmetric information, and market collapse. Our 
empirical results show that while the illiquidity factor is a source of asymmetric information on 
the SHSE, asymmetric information does not trigger a market collapse. 
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1.  Introduction 
The literature on the illiquidity or liquidity situation of a firm has mainly 
examined its impact on stock returns (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005; Martinez et al., 2005). Illiquidity reduces returns on assets; as a 
result, investors will demand extra expected returns. For assets that react strongly 
to changes in market-wide liquidity crises, illiquidity will lead to higher extra 
expected returns from investors, and investors are likely to require a systematic 
liquidity premium (Amihud, 2002; Huang and Wang, 2009).   
 
Another group of studies has focused on the impact of illiquidity directly on share 
prices (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Vayanos, 2004). Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986), for instance, argue that liquidity-based spread is a transaction cost for 
traders. When liquidity increases, transaction costs (spread) decrease, so share 
prices will increase as a result. On the other hand, illiquidity will decrease share 
prices because it causes the price discount, which is the present value of the 
expected stream of transaction costs through its lifetime.   
 
Vayanos (2004) establishes the link between illiquidity and share prices, and 
argues that illiquidity, by virtue of increasing volatility of share prices, decreases 
share prices. He demonstrates that during volatile times, assets’ liquidity premium 
increases; as a result, investors become more risk averse. 
 
Despite the relevance of illiquidity in understanding stock market performance, 
the literature on the illiquidity factor and stock market collapse is limited. Three   4 
studies stand out in this regard. Persand (2000) argues that knowledge of what 
drives liquidity, and the characterisation of its effects, will prove to be critical in 
preventing market crashes due to sudden evaporation of liquidity. He considers 
illiquidity to be a crucial factor for achieving market efficiency, and central bank 
policy making and related macroeconomics policies.   
 
Fernando and Herring (2008) posit that markets can collapse for two reasons. The 
first is the bursting of a bubble of an asset’s price and the other concerns the 
substantial information asymmetry about market fundamentals. However, they 
point out the possibility of a market collapse even in the absence of these two 
conditions. They show that common liquidity shocks may precipitate a shift in 
investors’ beliefs about the market, which in turn could lead to a market collapse.  
 
Huang and Wang (2009) use a general equilibrium model to link stock market 
liquidity and its impacts on asset prices. They find that if there are complete 
matching agents’ trading needs in the market, then endogenous
 order imbalances 
and the need for liquidity will increase. The endogenous liquidity needs will cause 
excessive selling in the market, which can lead to market collapse. 
 
One feature of the three studies discussed here is that they are all theoretical in 
nature. In other words, none of the studies in this literature have empirically 
examined the relationship between asymmetric information and market collapse. 
In light of the dearth of research on this topic, our paper makes three contributions 
to this literature. First, our research question: Is the illiquidity factor a priced risk 
factor in the Chinese stock market? is new, and thus provides fresh insights from   5 
the Chinese stock market. We find that the illiquidity factor is a priced risk factor 
in the Chinese stock market. Second, we specifically explore the empirical 
relationship between asymmetric information (proxied by the number of trades) 
and the illiquidity factor  based on the asset pricing model. We find that the 
illiquidity factor  is a source of asymmetric information on the Chinese stock 
market.   
 
Third, this is the first paper in this literature which provides a direct test for the 
relationship between asymmetric information and market collapse, where the 
latter is proxied by stock returns. To achieve this, we use the Fama-French three 
factor model and find that asymmetric information only has a statistically 
significant negative effect on stock returns in around 11% of cases. This implies 
very weak evidence of asymmetric information causing market collapse on the 
Chinese stock market. We explain why this is likely to be the case. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the data 
used in this paper and considers some preliminary empirical evidence. Section 3 
contains the empirical results showing that the illiquidity factor is a priced risk 
factor on the Chinese stock market.  Section 4 describes the conceptual 
relationship between market collapse, the illiquidity factor, and asymmetric 
information, while section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 
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2. Data and Some Preliminary Empirical Evidence 
The data is collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database. We use individual daily and monthly returns for all stocks 
traded on the Chinese continuous market from January 1995 to May 2009. The 
data series relate to the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE), which is the main 
stock exchange in China. 
   
The market return variable is an equally weighted portfolio comprising of all 
sample stocks available in a given month or on a particular day. For the risk-free 
rate of return, we use the Chinese 1-year Time Deposit Rate. Using all the 
individual stocks, we follow Martinez et al. (2005) to construct 20 portfolios, i.e. 
10 portfolios for liquidity measure. In addition, we form 10 traditional portfolios 
according to market value. To form the portfolios, monthly returns are calculated. 
Other data that are employed include the number of shares traded and the Yuan 
trading volume of the common stocks in the portfolios.   
 
Following the methods proposed by Martinez et al. (2005), several proxies are 
used for risk factors, which we include in different asset pricing models. For the 
size variable in the Fama–French three-factor model, risk is proxied by the market 
value, based on the number of shares of each firm in December multiplied by their 
price at the end of each month in  the following year. The SMB (returns of 
small-size portfolios minus returns of big-size portfolios) and HML (returns of 
high book-to-market portfolios minus returns of low book-to-market portfolios) 
variables for the Fama-French portfolios are calculated according to the market   7 
value of each firm, based on its total market capitalisation value in the previous 
month. We divide our sample stocks into three groups based on the total market 
capitalisation value in the previous month. These are the smallest 30% of stocks 
(S); 30% of stocks in the middle range (M); and the largest 30% of stocks (B). 
The sample stocks are also divided into two groups, namely largest 50% (H) and 
lowest 50% (L), based on the book-to-market ratio  in the last month of the 
previous year. This leads to six different portfolios: (S, L), (S, H), (M, L), (M, H), 
(B, L) and (B, H), and the average returns for these portfolios are denoted as P1, 
P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6, respectively. So, now SMB = (P1 + P2)/2 - (P5 + P6)/2 
and HML = (P2 + P4 + P6)/3 - (P1 + P3 + P5)/3. We use the arithmetic mean of 
the BM ratio as the state variable in the conditional asset pricing model. 
 
In order to have a necessary minimum number of observations, sample stocks 
need to have a return history of at least 36 months to the end of May 2009 (Eun 
and Huang, 2007). Therefore, we only include stocks with a minimum of 36 
monthly return observations so that the test period can be at least 12 months. 
Some of the parameters, for example, the total risk, are estimated using returns on 





The descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 1. In particular, we 
report the mean value, volatilities, and other related characteristics of market 
returns, including the Fama–French factors. In addition, the table also contains the 
                                                        
1  From 1999, changes in accounting procedures and regulations caused some listed companies to experience 
negative book value of equity. These companies are excluded after their book value turns negative.   8 
descriptive statistics of liquidity-based risk proxy, which is the Illiquidity Factor 
(ILLQ)—estimated using the approach suggested by Amihud (2002).   
  INSERT TABLE 1 
 
From Amihud (2002), the price impact for stock i in month t,  , is given by 
the average daily ratio of absolute return to Yuan volume over the month: 
 
 
       
 
  and    are the return and the Yuan volume (in millions of Yuans) for 
stock i on day d in month t.   is the number of observations for stock i in month 
t.    is computed for stocks with at least 15 observations on return and 
volume during the month. 
 
In order to make the series stationary, we multiply the original measure by a 
scaling factor which is from Acharya and Pedersen (2005),  , where    is 
the total Yuan value at the end of month t-1 of the stocks included in the 
cross-sectional average in month t and    is the corresponding value for January 
1995. The scaled market-wide price impact for month t,  , is given by: 
 
 
    
 
Nt is the number of available stocks at month t.   9 
 
As can be seen, these liquidity-based risk factors exhibit relatively large 
abnormalities. The SMB and HML market-wide measures have left-skewed 
distributions on the SHSE. In general, correlation coefficients are low. In contrast 
to Martinez et al. (2005) and Liu (2006)
2, we do not find a relatively high positive 
correlation between ILLQ and HML. This shows that ILLQ is more accurate for 
measuring liquidity risk in China. More in line with our expectations, we find that 
market returns are negatively related to ILLQ, which is consistent with  the 
findings from Liu (2006).   
 
Next,  based on the year-end market value of each stock,  we construct 10 
portfolios, sorted according to their size. The portfolios range from MV1 (smallest) 
to MV10 (largest).  Table 2 presents the average descriptive statistics of these 
portfolios. Returns on these portfolios are to be used to test the asset pricing 
models with illiquidity factor. The volatilities of these portfolios’ returns are more 
or less consistent with expectations: the greatest volatility  is experienced by 
stocks with smallest capitalisations. Furthermore, consistent with the findings of 
Martinez  et al. (2005), we also find that on the SHSE, stocks with a greater 
possibility of return reversals increase when the level of liquidity declines.   
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
For the ILLQ betas, our results differ from that of both Martinez et al. (2005) and 
Liu (2006), in that we do not find a large difference in average returns between 
ILLQ1 and ILLQ10. However, there is a clear monotonic relation in our results 
between the average returns and the sensitivity of returns to the ILLQ factor.   10 
Moreover, average returns  of  stocks that are negatively sensitive to ILLQ are 
higher than the average returns of stocks that are positively sensitive to the ILLQ. 
But the differences are much smaller than that reported in Martinez et al. (2005) 
and Liu (2006).   
 
In addition, we find significant liquidity betas only for extreme portfolios and in 
response to shocks to market liquidity. The ILLQ1 stocks move in opposite 
directions compared with the ILLQ10 stocks. This is similar to the findings of 
Martinez et al. (2005). 
 
3. Pricing Illiquidity Factor 
In testing for whether the illiquidity factor is a priced risk factor on the Chinese 
stock market, we follow Martinez et al. (2005). They postulate that if the pricing 
effect of market liquidity exists, there would be systematic difference in average 
returns (alpha) of the portfolios that are sorted according to their sensitivity to 
measures of liquidity. So, in the asset pricing models that we employ, the average 
return of a portfolio with higher sensitivity to liquidity  changes should be 
significantly higher than that of the portfolio with lower sensitivity. As such, it 
makes sense to test for the significance of the alphas, after adjustment for risk. For 
example, when there is a  significant liquidity premium related to  aggregate 
liquidity risk, the difference between average returns on ILLQ10 and ILLQ1 
portfolios should be significantly positive, when market risks are accounted for 
(Martinez  et al., 2005). This testing strategy can also be found in Pastor and 
Stamburgh (2003) and Chen (2005).     11 
 
Following Martinez et al. (2005), three alternative pricing models are used for the 
tests. They are the traditional CAPM model, the modified CAPM model that 
incorporates the illiquidity factor, and the Fama–French three-factor model. In 
Table 3, we report different alphas for each year between January 1995 and May 
2009.   
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
The results for the 10 portfolios that are sorted by betas on the ILLQ factor show a 
strong significant liquidity premium for each of the portfolios in all models. The 
liquidity based CAPM, which includes the ILLQ factor, contains the highest 
absolute value of the liquidity premium. This finding, we notice, is consistent with 
Martinez  et al.  (2005). We, however, notice that  the difference between the 
liquidity premium (the positive alpha) in the CAPM and other liquidity-based 
models is not as high as in the case of Martinez et al. (2005). The implication of 
this is that on the Chinese stock market, there is significant evidence of liquidity 
premium using ILLQ as a measure of aggregate, or market-wide, liquidity. This 
finding that the ILLQ is a priced liquidity risk factor is consistent with Martinez et 




4. Market Collapse: Conceptual Framework and Motivation 
It is now well established that a market will not function properly if information   12 
about asset price is not homogenous among investors; that is, there exists 
asymmetric information about asset prices. This can be seen from the models of 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991). Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) show that the bid-ask price will increase with an increase in 
information asymmetry and the degree of uncertainty regarding the asset value. In 
the empirical literature, many believe that the real indicator of asymmetric 
information is better proxied by the number of trades rather than the volume.  
 
Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) argue that the main reason for the market 
collapse is that outsiders refuse to trade with insiders because the high asymmetric 
information potentially gives insiders more opportunities for hedging, which can 
result in losses for outsiders.     
 
Asymmetric information prompts traders to use different dynamic trading 
strategies to measure market conditions. But uninformed traders often cannot 
detect that price changes are caused by insider trading. Informed traders hold the 
private information and they always make profits earlier than uninformed traders 
(Kyle, 1985). Even market makers will lose money from informed traders. 
Actually, informed traders split their insider information behind noise traders 
across time, which can ensure long-run profits. It follows that the price goes up 
initially, but as the level of asymmetric information increases, price correction will 
occur, leading to compensations from the uninformed traders. The relatively large 
price changes have a higher probability of inducing a market collapse.   
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In the event of a bad news, the price of the stock will decline. In this case, 
investors will be more risk averse and will refrain from holding risky stocks. They 
will sell their stocks, which will reduce prices. Due to the price reduction, the 
market lacks the capacity to provide funds for submitting new orders; as a result, a 
market collapse will eventuate (Grossman, 1988). 
 
Before we discuss the relationship between asymmetric information and bubbles, 
let us define a bubble. A bubble will eventuate when an asset price is larger than 
its fundamental value. Large changes in prices are caused by shifts in the 
fundamental values (LeRoy and Porter, 1981; Shiller, 1989). Normally, the 
fundamental value of an asset is difficult to determine but it can be sorted out by 
the asymmetric information. Gennotte and Leland (1990) point out that the price 
drop is a bad signal for the fundamental value of a stock because traders hold 
asymmetric information for the value of the stock. When this happens, there are 
more uncertainties for dynamic hedging strategies because uninformed traders 
perceive that the insider information has been combined into the fundamental 
value, which thus does not reveal the real price of assets. As a result, they will sell 
their assets quickly, which will reduce the price of assets. The market position can 
worsen when other market participants begin to sell their shares because more and 
more traders perceive that due to insider information, asset prices are distorted.   
 
In addition, Allen et al. (1993) find strong presence of bubbles if each trader has 
private information; that is, if information is heterogeneous. In other words, strong 
bubbles will not arise if there is common knowledge in the market. On the other   14 
hand, a bursting bubble can cause a market collapse. A bursting bubble means an 
excessive asset price rise before the crash. It seems all market traders have the 
common knowledge in the market and they believe they can sell assets at a very 
high price but others cannot. Each trader will have a different level of asymmetric 
information; in other words, among traders heterogeneity will exist in terms of the 
degree of asymmetric information. When this asymmetric information is 
aggregated (that is for the market as a whole), the effect on asset price can be 
relatively more severe, sufficient to cause the market to crash. In this sense, 
bursting bubbles can cause market collapse with asymmetric information rather 
than bubbles themselves; for related discussion, see Allen et al. (1993), Allen and 
Gale (1994) and Brunnermeier (2001). 
   
In view of the existence of time-varying information asymmetry and the evidence 
that information asymmetry is one of the drivers of liquidity in order-driven 
markets (Brockman and Chung, 2002), we can infer that aggregate variations in 
information asymmetry might explain variations in illiquidity on the Chinese 
market. As such, there may be asset price bubbles based on market-wide 
information asymmetry component, which can explain variations in firm level 
information asymmetry and illiquidity.  Barclay and Warner (1993) examine 
informed investors’ trade-size choices and report that informed trades concentrate 
their trades in medium size and tend to hide their identity by broking up their large 
accumulations (10,000 shares or more) into medium-size trades. From this, one 
may find a positive association between the number of trades and asymmetric 
information.     15 
 
Jones et al. (1994) show that it is the transactions per se, rather than their volume, 
that generate volatility, and that trade volume has no information beyond that 
contained in the frequency of transactions. Based on these findings, Chordia et al. 
(2000) and Brockman and Chung (2002) argue that the number of trades rather 
than the trade size can be used as an indicator of asymmetric information.   
 
Based on the discussion so far, in formulating our empirical model, we use the 
number of trades as the measure of asymmetric information. Essentially, our 
empirical objective is to model the impact of a priced liquidity risk factor (ILLQ) 
on the number of trades (our measure of asymmetric information). It follows that 
our main hypothesis here is that the liquidity risk factor increases asymmetric 
information. To control for market volatility, we also include the market returns 
variable in our proposed model. The estimable model has the following form: 
 
NTradesJ,t = α + θILLQ + δReturnM,t + εJ,t  (3) 
 
where NTradesJ,t   is the total number of trades for firm J during the trading day t 
as a measure of transaction frequency. ILLQ is the priced factor of liquidity in the 
sample. ReturnM,t   is the equally weighted average of the daily return for all firms 
which can control the volatility in the market; similar control variables have been 
used by Chordia et al. (2000). The results for model are presented in Table 4. On 
the SHSE, from the time-series regressions, the number of market-wide 
concurrent coefficient that is positive and significant accounts for 63.5% of total   16 
estimates. Given that the number of trades is a reliable indicator  of informed 
trading, as argued earlier, these results suggest that there is a common component 
in the number of trades, implying the illiquidity factor is an important factor for 
explaining asymmetric information.   
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
So far, we have ascertained an indirect relationship between the illiquidity factor 
and market collapse through the asymmetric information channel. However, the 
direct impact of asymmetric information on market collapse is of the main interest. 
Alas, this relationship has not been tested in this literature so far. In what follows, 
we make a first attempt at testing the direct relationship between asymmetric 
information and market collapse. We have already defined asymmetric 
information, now in order to model its impact on market collapse (or survival), we 
need to define market collapse. This is simple: we define market collapse by the 
stock returns. It follows that if asymmetric information (that is, the number of 
trades) has a statistically significant negative effect on stock returns, then this 
implies market collapse. On the other hand, if asymmetric information has a 
statistically significant positive effect on stock returns, then this can be perceived 
as asymmetric information-led growth in stock returns. In order to test this 
relationship, we augment the conventional Fama-French model with our 
asymmetric information proxy variable. We, thus, propose the following model: 
 
ReturnJ,t =α +γ1(ReturnM,t – Returnf) + γ2SMBJ,t + γ3HMLJ,t + γ4NTradesJ,t + εJ,t t ,(4) 
 
 
where ReturnM,t is the market return of SHSE at time t;; Returnf is the risk free rate   17 
which is the Chinese 1-year Time Deposit Rate; SMBJ,t is the returns of small-size 
portfolios minus returns of big-size portfolios at time t; HMLJ,t is the returns of 
high book-to-market portfolios minus the returns of low book-to-market portfolios 
at time t; and NTradesJ,t is the total number of trades, our proxy for asymmetric 
information, for firm J during the trading day t.   
 
The null hypothesis is that asymmetric information has a statistically significant 
negative effect on stock returns. A statistically significant and negative 
relationship provides direct evidence of market collapse induced by asymmetric 
information. Our interest is only on this relationship, hence to conserve space, we 
only report results relating to this hypothesis. The results are presented in Table 5
2
                                                        
3 We only report the results for the asymmetric information. The results for Fama-French three factors are 
available upon request. 
. 
We find the coefficient on the asymmetric information variable to be negative and 
statistically significant for 11.40% of the time and positive and statistically 
significant in 6.96% of cases. This low number of significant (and negative) cases 
implies that asymmetric information has weak effects for market returns when we 
control for the Fama-French three factors. On the basis of this result, we can 
conclude that on the Chinese stock market, asymmetric information does not 
contribute to a market collapse. There are several reasons for this, as we explain 
next. It seems that the Chinese stock markets impressive growth has been 
achieved against this backdrop of a market exposed to asymmetric information. 
Some sources of asymmetric information are as follows. First, Chinese firms do 
not fully disclose material changes in their business conditions, and published 
statements do not always meet international accounting standards. In addition,   18 
there is widespread share manipulation and insider trading, and little protection 
for investors (Chan et al., 2008).   
 
Second, for a significantly long period of time, A-shares could only be purchased 
and  traded by domestic investors. A feature of these investors was that they 
possessed very weak knowledge and experience in investments. They also likely 
suffer from imperfect information (Chen et al., 2007). Beginning in 2002, China 
launched a program of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) under 
which overseas investors could invest in and trade Chinese A-shares through 
qualified institutional investors. This marked an important step towards opening 
the Chinese share market and reducing market segmentation.   
 
Third, foreign investors in China pay much less than domestic investors for 
intrinsically identical shares (Gordon and Li, 2003). This implies price asymmetry. 
Fourth, trading on the Chinese stock market is restricted to the local currency, the 
Renminbi (RMB) (Tan et al., 2008). This implies that sources of asymmetry 
emanating from the Chinese exchange rate market, for instance, could transmit to 
the financial market (see, for instance, Feng and Alon, 2007). 
 
Fifth, in a recent study, Tan et al. (2008) test the herding behavior by A-share 
investors on the SHSE. They find that the market displays strong asymmetric 
characteristics; that is, herding behavior is higher when (a) stock markets are 
performing well, (b) trading volume is high, and (c) market volatility is high. 
   19 
Sixth, on average, individual hold only one-third of outstanding shares, while 
two-thirds are held by government entities. This greater market power enables 
government entities to act as controlling insiders, making corporate decisions that 
could possibly infringe upon the rights of individual shareholders (Eun and Huang 
2007: 454). A common institutional weakness of the Chinese stock market is that 
shareholders rights are not well established in China, reflecting in large part 
opaque corporate governance and weak legal enforcement (Eun and Huang, 2007). 
China did not have well established securities laws until 1999, while a code of 
corporate governance for listed firms only came into effect in 2002 (Fong, 2009).   
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper attempts to investigate three related issues: (a) whether liquidity risk 
premium is priced in the Chinese stock market, (b) the role of the illiquidity factor 
in generating asymmetric information, and (c) whether asymmetric information 
causes market collapse. We consider these empirical issues by utilizing data for 
the period January 1995 to May 2009 relating to the Shanghai stock exchange 
(SHSE).   
 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find systematic 
differences in the market risk-adjusted average returns of our liquidity-beta-sorted 
portfolios because the  liquidity risk factors are priced in the Chinese market. 
Using three alternative pricing models: the traditional CAPM, Fama-French 
model, and the CAPM liquidity-based models constructed by augmenting the with 
the liquidity factor (ILLQ), we find differences in alphas for each year between   20 
January 1995 and May 2009. Our results show that the liquidity risk premium 
only exists for the ILLQ factor. 
 
Second,  the literature suggests that asymmetric information is an important 
determinant of asset price bubbles. Following this line of research and based on 
the priced common liquidity (ILLQ), we directly test  the hypothesis that 
commonality in liquidity induces asymmetric information, and find this to be the 
case on the SHSE. Since theoretically it has been shown that the greater the level 
of asymmetric information, the greater the probability of a market collapse, in the 
final exercise we, for the first time in this literature, test the relationship between 
asymmetric information and market collapse. We find that, contrary to the 
theoretical conjecture, asymmetric information has a very weak effect on market 
returns on the SHSE: we find that in only around 11% of cases asymmetric 
information has a statistically significant negative effect on market returns. This 
finding sheds critical light on the working of the Chinese stock market, in that 
asymmetric information is a particularly severe problem in China. Chinese firms 
tend to disclose only incomplete or even biased information about their business. 
Moreover, in the marketplace share manipulation and insider trading are pervasive. 
In this environment, while our results show that the illiquidity factor is a source of 
asymmetric information, asymmetric information does not induce the market 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Risk Factors 
Risk factor  Average return  Volatility  Skewness  Excess kurtosis 
Market Returns (RM)  0.23  0.96  0.903  1.588 
Small – Big Factor 
(SMB)  -0.76  0.51  -1.698  8.473 
High – Low Factor 
(HML)  -0.35  0.65  -0.917  3.970 
Illiquidity Measure 
(ILLQ)  0.24  0.93  1.316  3.712 
  RM  SMB  HML  ILLQ 
Market Returns (RM)  1.000  0.040  -0.132  -0.091 
Small – Big Factor 
(SMB)    1.000  0.208  0.019 
High – Low Factor 
(HML)      1.000  -0.153 
Illiquidity Measure 
(ILLQ)        1.000 
 
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the liquidity risk factors on the Chinese Stock Exchange 
during the January 1995 to May 2009 period.     25 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Portfolios of Stocks on the Shanghai Market 
 
Portfolios  Average return  Volatility  ILLQ beta (t statistic) 
Portfolio based on Illiquidity Measure (ILLQ1)  0.40  1.16  -0.341 (-9.91) 
Portfolio based on Illiquidity Measure (ILLQ2)  0.20  0.86  -0.880 (-12.60) 
Portfolio based on Illiquidity Measure (ILLQ3)  0.24  1.10  -0.567 (-11.22) 
Portfolio based on Illiquidity Measure (ILLQ4)  0.24  1.15  -0.343 (-9.52) 
Portfolio based on Illiquidity Measure (ILLQ5)  0.22  0.92  -0.157 (-4.65) 
Portfolio based on Illiquidity Measure (ILLQ6)  0.21  0.89  0.375 (4.42) 
Portfolio based on Illiquidity Measure (ILLQ7)  0.21  0.93  0.879 (4.33) 
Portfolio based on Illiquidity Measure (ILLQ8)  0.24  0.96  1.613 (4.34) 
Portfolio based on Illiquidity Measure (ILLQ9)  0.23  0.87  3.454 (6.10) 
Portfolio based on Illiquidity Measure (ILLQ10)  0.23  0.84  10.520 (6.83) 
Portfolio based on Market Value (MV1)  0.36  1.16  -0.181 (0.52) 
Portfolio based on Market Value (MV2)  0.25  0.95  -0.069 (-0.33) 
Portfolio based on Market Value (MV3)  0.22  0.93  -0.436 (-0.89) 
Portfolio based on Market Value (MV4)  0.21  0.88  -1.213 (-1.56) 
Portfolio based on Market Value (MV5)  0.21  0.92  -1.036 (-2.32) 
Portfolio based on Market Value (MV6)  0.22  0.86  -0.866 (-2.14) 
Portfolio based on Market Value (MV7)  0.22  0.92  -0.714 (-1.90) 
Portfolio based on Market Value (MV8)  0.17  0.85  -3.102 (-2.32) 
Portfolio based on Market Value (MV9)  0.15  0.84  -4.220 (-1.93) 
Portfolio based on Market Value (MV10)  0.18  0.88  -13.809 (-2.83) 
 
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the portfolios of the stocks on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). 
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Table 3: Differences between Alphas of Extreme Portfolios sorted on Aggregate Liquidity and Market 
Value January 1995-May 2009 
 
(A) Liquidity-sorted portfolios   
   
Alpha ILLQ10-alpha ILLQ1 
Value  χ² Test  P value 
CAPM alpha 
 
0.04  1.676  -0.030 
Fama-French alpha  0.01  1.198  0.407 
CAPM+ILLQ alpha  1.45  1.676  -0.023 
(B) Size-sorted portfolios   
   
Alpha MV10-alpha MV1 
 
Value  χ² Test  P value 
CAPM alpha 
 
-0.16  0.587  -0.151 
  Fama-French alpha  -0.03  -1.696  0.210 
CAPM+ILLQ alpha  -2.21  0.817  -0.173 
The summary statistics represent the time-series-annualised averages of returns, volatilities, and factor betas of two 
differently sorted portfolios according to: (i) the sensitivity of returns to the monthly average across days of the absolute 
percentage price change per Yuan of trading volume (ILLQ); and (ii) market capitalisation (MV). ILLQ1 includes stocks 
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Table 4: Asymmetric Information and illiquidity factor 
 
Firm-by-firm time-series regressions are based on: 
 
ΔNTradesJ,t = α + θILLQJ,t + δReturnM,t + εJ,t , (3) 
 
where NTradesJ,t is the total number of trades for firm J during the trading day t. ILLQJ,t is the sensitivity of returns to the 
monthly average across days of the absolute percentage price change per Yuan of trading volume. ReturnM,t is the equally 
weighted average of the daily return for all firms in the market. The symbol  ∆ preceding a variable name denotes its 
proportional change across successive trading days. The specific dependent variable firms are excluded from the market and 














%-  and 
inSig. 
%-  and 
Sig. 
ILLQJ,t  θ  1.751 
(1.061) 
  63.5%    35.2%    1.3%     0 
ReturnM,t  δ  0.522 
(0.195) 
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Table 5: Market Collapse and Asymmetric Information from Fama French Three Factors Model 
 
Firm-by-firm time-series regressions are based on: 
 
ReturnJ,t =α + γ1SizeJ,t + γ2SMBJ,t + γ3HMLJ,t + γ4ΔNTradesJ,t + εJ,t t , (4) 
 
where SizeJ,t is firm size which is the logarithm of the market capitalisation in billions of Chinese Yuan. SMBJ,t is the returns 
of small-size portfolios minus returns of big-size portfolios at time t, and HMLJ,t is the returns of high book-to-market 
portfolios minus the returns of low book-to-market portfolios at time t. NTradesJ,t is the total number of trades for firm J 
during the trading day t. The symbol  ∆ preceding a variable name denotes its proportional change across successive trading 













%-  and 
inSig. 
%-  and 
Sig. 
∆NTradesM,t  γ4  0.212 
(0.273) 
  6.96%    34.06%    47.58%    11.40% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 